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THE LADY VANISHES: 
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Dr Bela Bonita Chatterjee* 
 
‘We were in a vortex of swirling in/out, appear/disappear, recover/lose, 
viewer/viewed.’ -  Anne Bottomley, ‘The Many Appearances of the Body in Feminist 
Scholarship’1 
 
‘Censor the body and you sensor breath and speech at the same time. Write your self. 
Your body must be heard.’ – Helene Cixous, 'The Laugh of the Medusa' 2 
 
Introduction: Dis/appearance – a Zenith 
 
 It is an oscillating state of disappearance and appearance, of waxing and 
waning, which signifies one particular point where we are now at in addressing and 
questioning the body. Certainly, the preoccupation with extremes of bodily presence 
and absence can readily be seen in the popular media. Somewhere after the news 
channels (reporting with increasing concern on the growing problems of obesity and 
starvation) but before the shopping channels (selling clothes for the extra-large and 
featuring models that are extra-thin), unhappily sandwiched between ‘Dog Borstal’ 
(overweight and mutinous canines) and 48 more music channels, one can find 
programme after programme on the body. While Dog Borstal is in the ad-break 
(which features slimming aids and exercise items) ‘Half Ton Hospital’ is over on the 
next channel, which shows near-spherical people as they struggle to gain control of 
their riotous flesh, alarmingly amplified by the effects of widescreen. The widescreen 
effect spreads over onto other channels, where the viewer can observe a display of fat 
babies (which I thought were supposed to be fat, but in this case, are clinically 
overweight), share in High Definition3 the extreme cosmetic surgeries of minor 
celebrities as they sculpt and reform, inject and subtract according to fashion (it seems 
that interior designers are out, designer interiors are in … ), then watch it all disappear 
in yet more documentaries following the heaving endeavours of those now trying to 
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1 Bottomley Anne ‘The Many Appearances of the Body in Feminist Scholarship’ in Bainham Andrew 
Day Sclater Shelley and Richards Martin (eds) Body Lore and Laws 2002 Hart Oxford p 127 at 131. 
2 Cixous Helene ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (transl. Cohen Keith and Cohen Paula) (1976) 1 Signs 875 
880. 
3 High Definition refers to a new development in digital television, where the picture is up to five times 
more detailed than standard definition television. It can be seen as symptomatic of the obsessive pursuit 
of revealing the body in ever-closer detail, to the point where pixels and people become 
indistinguishable, and an example of the technologised cyborg body that I discuss below. For 
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shed their excess poundage, and where the process has gone into a total reverse 
through varying degrees of anorexia and liposuction.  
 
 It comes as no surprise, then, that this theme of dis/appearance is also 
identifiable as a prominent feature of contemporary academic work on the body. 
Bodies, particularly female bodies, are theorised at their apparent corporeal extremes. 
At apogee and perigee, we theorise bodies on the cusp. Their phases are charted by 
‘fat studies’4 investigating the gendered politics of corporeal weight, confronting and 
critiquing the current Western cultural unacceptability of excess flesh, studies which 
are counterposed (if not exactly counterpoised) with a related focus on anorexia, 
where the corresponding lack of weight in anorexic women is variously interpreted as 
a dangerous and disturbing effect of patriarchal expectations on the female form or 
explored as an act of resistance to such expectations, a specific and empowering 
refusal of the socially acceptable female body.5 Regardless of its state of being – in 
appearance or disappearance, the body appears to possess an irresistible gravity as 
much as a gravitas – a force of attraction borne from its mass which captures and 
holds our attention.6 Feminist theory gravitates around the body, is drawn towards it, 
if not always in a steady orbit.7 The body can be seen to exert its own sort of lunar 
influence, effecting tides of interest but retaining an enduring pull even when 
apparently invisible, as feminists interrogate the complexities of its sexed and 
gendered corporeality whilst scrutinising its symbolic absence in the unpacking of 
Cartesian identity.8 The theme of dis/appearance can again be seen in relation to in 
the sexed corporeal body itself, whose metaphorical vanishing can be noted in the 
                                                 
4 From a UK perspective see http://fatstudiesuk.edublogs.org/ (last accessed 12 August 2008). Fat 
studies appears in a wider context than examining weight-based oppression, see e.g. Guthman Julie and 
DuPuis Melanie ‘Embodying neoliberalism: economy, culture and the politics of fat’ (2006) 24 
Environment and Planning D 427. 
5 Elspeth Probyn, for example, notes the ‘splinters of pride that accompanied the disgust’ evoked by 
memories of the anorexic body. The tension between presence and absence runs throughout her 
discussion. See Probyn Elspeth Carnal Appetites: FoodSexIdentities Routledge London 2000 p 125. 
For a fascinating critique of (dis)embodiment and anorexia online, see Ferreday Debra ‘Unspeakable 
bodies: Erasure, embodiment and the pro-ana community’ (2003) 6 International Journal of Cultural 
Studies 277, where Ferreday notes that the proliferation of the anorexic body on pro-anorexia websites 
can be seen as evidence of a deliberate refusal of (self-)erasure. The ‘vanishing point’ of size zero is 
complicated further in Ferreday, forthcoming. In ‘Writing Size Zero’, Meuret considers anorexia and 
writing as ‘two faces of the same coin’, their both being ‘signifying practices … grounded in the body.’ 
(Meuret Isabelle ‘Writing Size Zero: Figuring Anorexia in Contemporary World Literatures’ 
http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/mso/hid/hid4/meuret%20paper.pdf last accessed 26 October 2008). I 
thank Dr. Ferreday for bringing Meuret’s work to my attention.  
6 In this respect, the body in feminist theory has weight, in the sense of seriousness and significance as 
well as mass – theoretical, ontological, epistemological, as Probyn terms it, ‘the empirical weight of the 
female body’ Probyn Elspeth ‘This Body Which Is Not One: Speaking an Embodied Self’ (1991) 6 
Hypatia 111 at 113. Working through the astronomical metaphors of planetary weight and gravity, I 
think it’s interesting that Cixous uses the metaphor of cosmos and space to conceptualise the female 
body more than the astral spheres within that space: ‘a moving, limitlessly changing ensemble, a 
cosmos tirelessly traversed by Eros, an immense astral space not organised around any one sun that’s 
any more of a star than the others.’ Cixous above note 2 at 889, my emphasis.  I think that the reverse 
also works, considering as spheres not spaces, especially given that Cosmos in the sense of a universe 
as an orderly system is contrasted with Chaos, in the sense of original matter in unorganised state 
before the creation of distinct forms. 
7 Elements of this argument can be seen in the debates over ‘new materialism’ in feminist theory, 
which I discuss below. I thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing these debates to my attention.   
8 On this point consider Bray Abigail and Colebrook Claire ‘The Haunted Flesh: Corporeal Feminism 
and the Politics of (Dis)Embodiment’ (1998) 24 Signs 35. 
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reductions of cultural and legal synecdoche, where the female reproductive and/or 
sexual organs become representative for the whole. The body’s physical 
dis/appearance, a rather more literal process, can be seen in the form of the 
disaggregation of the corporeal woman, identified as being effected by the 
invasion/pervasion of new technologies.9 As Camilla Griggers observes, ‘even the 
organs are separating from the body … [t]he womb is disjunct from the breast, for 
example, the vagina from the mouth that speaks’.10 The body is atomised, ‘composed 
of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of motion and rest, of speeds and 
slownesses between particles that define a body’,11 and yet this process of revelation, 
the exposure of the body in its highest resolution, can be seen to simultaneously risk 
the body’s disappearance amongst the very detail of its particles.12 Even the return to 
the particles, the materials of which the body is constructed, can be seen to be marked 
by dis/appearance. The field of new or neo-materialism13 invoked by writings on the 
ontology of the body and biology14 exhorts a return to a focus on the stuff of matter 
and for the visibility of the material, arguing that matter itself and the role of matter in 
materialising the body have become invisible in light of the prominence of linguistic 
and cultural representations. According to new materialist thinking, matter has 
dematerialised, a multivalent vanishing which renders it immaterial in the senses of 
being evacuated of material qualities – as in materiality or ‘things’ being turned into 
linguistic or cultural representations – and of being irrelevant.15 The need for a return 
                                                 
9 Considering cosmetic surgery, Gimlin notes the role of the ‘absent body’ in experiencing the self; the 
body we are largely unconscious of except where it reappears in consciousness at the moment of its 
dysfunction, hence her reference (following Leder) to ‘bodily dys-appearance’ triggering moments 
where the self re-orients towards the goal of bodily stability and subsequent disappareance. See Gimlin 
Debra (2006) ‘The Absent Body Project: Cosmetic Surgery as a Response to Bodily Dys-appearance’ 
40 Sociology 699.  
10 Griggers Camilla Becoming-Woman University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis 1997 p 48. See also 
Braidotti Rosi Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist 
Theory Columbia University Press New York 1994; Bradotti Rosi metamorphoses: Towards a 
Materialist Theory of Becoming Polity Cambridge 2002; Grosz Elizabeth 'From 'Intensities and Flows'' 
in Atkinson Tiffany (ed) The Body Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2005 p 142. 
11 Deleuze as quoted in Thain Alanna ‘The In-tensions of Extensions: Compagnie Marie Chouinard's 
bODY rEMIX/gOLDGERG vARIATIONS’ [capitals in the original] (2008) 19 differences 71. 
12 Karen Barad explores philosophical and scientific contemplations of atomism in her consideration of 
matter. She questions how we might consider ‘not only how human bodily contours are constituted 
through psychic process but how even the very atoms that make up the biological body come to matter 
… ’ Barad Karen ‘Posthuman Performativity: Towards an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
Matter’ (2003) 28 3 Signs 801 at 810. On such a ‘new materialist’ view, the intense foregrounding of 
the nature and role of matter is not necessarily problematic, but rather, desirable. See also Braidotti 
2002 above note 10. 
13 I take these terms from Hird, see Hird Myra J ‘Feminist Matters: New Materialist Considerations of 
Sexual Difference’ (2004) 5 Feminist Theory 22; See also Grosz Elizabeth The Nick of Time Duke 
University Press Durham and London 2004; Wilson Elizabeth A ‘Gut Feminism’ (2004) 15 (3) 
differences 66 at 85; Barad above note 12; Braidotti 2002 above note 10; Squier Susan and Littlefield 
Melissa M (co-editors) ‘Feminist Theory and/of Science’ Feminist Theory Special Issue (2004) 5 
Feminist Theory 123; Kirkby Vicky ‘Corporeal Habits: Addressing Essentialism Differently’ (1991) 6 
Hypatia 4; Bray and Coleman above note 8. 
14 Whilst new materialism focuses on the body and the importance of its matter, particularly biological 
matter, not all materialist writers see the biological as straightforward, for example, Braidotti has 
written that: 
The embodiedness of the subject is a form of bodily materiality, not of the natural, biological 
kind. I take the body as the complex interplay of highly constructed social and symbolic forces: 
it is not an essence, let alone a biological substance …  
Braidotti 2002 above note 10 at 20-21. 
15 See Barad above note 12 at 801.  
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to the material is premised on a disappearance; as suggested by some new materialist 
writers a return becomes necessary because feminism (amongst other scholarly fields) 
is too engaged with social constructionism, the linguistic and the cultural, hence the 
need to put the ‘real’ back into the corporeal, for the body to re-appear in scholarly 
thought:  
We need to return to, or perhaps invent anew, the concepts of nature, matter, 
and life … if we want to develop alternative models to those inscriptive and 
constructivist discourses that currently dominate … where the body is of 
interest only in its reflection through discourse … 16 
Yet as Ahmed points out, this founding gesture of invoking feminism’s negativity 
towards the biological as a justification for a return to the materiality of the body is 
itself founded on a disappearance, an act of erasure, this being the reductive reading 
of a legacy of feminist work on the body that clearly engages with biological insights 
and critiques of biology.17 The body is thus in a flickering state of absence, presence 
and in/stability, conjured as visible from a (never)vanished state, a postmodern, 
disaggregated body which explodes and a cyborg body which splices, disturbing the 
divisions between human, metal, mineral and animal as suggested by Donna 
Haraway's foundational analysis.18 This postmodern, disaggregated body is described 
as 'posthuman' by some commentators, posthuman bodies being 'the causes and 
effects of postmodern relations of power and pleasure, virtuality and reality … a 
technology, a screen, a projected image'.19 Even when not exploding or splicing, (or 
perhaps simultaneously) the boundedness,20 stability and singularity of the corporeal 
body itself is challenged. The body is theorised as an assemblage, a set of multiple 
and complex interactions and motions that both defy and exceed the boundaries of the 
skin and the temporal instance of the body’s appearance.21 This is distinct (but not 
necessarily separate) from recognising the body as constructed, in the sense of being 
given meaning through discourse, rather, this is a recognition of the body as 
construction, the physical substrate of the body, its flesh, blood and bones becoming 
separable, alloyed, malleable.  
 
In multiple fields of inquiry related to the body, then, it would seem that our 
current thinking is framed by questions of its presence and absence, and where limit 
analyses – examples of thinking the body at the most extreme margins of 
dis/appearance – can be identified as being central to contemporary interrogations. 
Pursuing the theme of dis/appearance, in this article I wish to take one particular 
manifestation of the body, that of the virtual – in the sense of digital, cyber – in order 
                                                 
16 Grosz 2004 above note 13 at 2-3. 
17 Ahmed Sara ‘Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the 
‘New Materialism’ (2008) 15 European Journal of Women’s Studies 23. Compare Tuin Iris van der 
‘Deflationary Logic: Response to Sarah Ahmed’s ‘Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks 
on the Founding Gestures of the ‘New Materialism’’ (2008) 15 European Journal of Women’s Studies 
411  
18 Haraway Donna 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the 
1980s' (1985) 80 Socialist Review 65. For an example of cyborg analysis in law see Lim Hillary 
'Caesareans and Cyborgs' (1999) 7 Feminist Legal Studies 133.  
19 Halberstam Judith and Livingston Ira (eds) Posthuman Bodies Indiana University Press Indianapolis 
1995 p 5. 
20 On boundedness, gender and law see Naffine Ngaire ‘The Body Bag’ in Naffine Ngaire and Owens 
Rosemary (eds) Sexing the Subject of Law Law Book Company Information Services Sydney 1997 p 
79. 
21 The theme of bodies and temporal disruption is taken from Deleuze, following Spinoza, in Thain 
above note 11 at 79, and echoed by Cixous, above note 2.  
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to think through the question of the law-body nexus for feminist legal theorists. The 
virtual body seems to be a particularly appropriate vehicle for this task, in that it is a 
place where the thinking and theorising of gender, body, textuality and law can be 
seen to intersect. In engaging with the 'writing' part of 'writing the legal body' in a 
broad sense, to encompass concepts of discursive inscription creating the intelligible 
body and writing the body as a form of politics, but also considering the actual 
mechanics of writing itself, it arguably makes sense to consider the most recent 
technologies of writing – those of digital media, and their consequent textual bodies. 
In the investigation that follows, I intend to sketch out how the virtual body speaks to 
the themes of gender and writing the body, and consider how this can be seen to relate 
to the question of the law-body nexus, arguing that the virtual body as an example of 
limit analysis can be a useful tool for problematising concepts of the corporeal and 
gendered body for feminist legal theorists. In order to establish this argument, I will 
describe how feminist commentators have theorised the body in cyberspace, and how 
this virtual body is seen to challenge current articulations of gender and corporeality. I 
will explore the validity of the virtual body as a written body in several senses of 
'writing the body' and consider how the virtual body throws light on the concept of the 
written body, then turn to the question of writing the legal body in feminist legal 
theory, arguing that the virtual body can be deployed in a number of ways, and that 
the 'disappearance' of the body that the virtual body suggests is not necessarily 
problematic for feminist legal thinking, which has traditionally focused on gendered 
embodiment before the law, but can be seen as productive in leading us to interrogate 
the law-body nexus in specific and innovative ways. 
 
Gender, writing and the virtual body 
 
 The rise of cyberspace as a novel arena for social activity has drawn great 
critical attention over the last two decades or so, and a considerable body of work, 
uniquely interdisciplinary in its outlook,22 now exists on theorising the cultures and 
identities that arise therein.23 Feminist commentary forms a significant part of this 
critique, focusing in particular on theorising power, gender, identity and the body in 
virtual space(s). Similar to the extension of gender theorising in other academic 
spheres, feminist critiques of cyberspace have been broadly influenced by distinct 
strands of thinking, and there is no clear or singular evaluation.24 Whereas cyberspace 
can be seen as an important medium for mobilising new forms of feminist activism 
                                                 
22An astonishing array of disciplines has been drawn in to theorising cyberspace, but it has to be said 
that law has been late in coming to this opportunity, and even then its contribution has been very 
limited. I think that this is largely due to the determination of cyberspace as primarily commercial and 
criminological space in legal terms, as opposed to a social space. Valuable inroads have been made in 
respect of some criminological work, but arguably not in mainstream law, as a glance in any Internet 
Law textbook will usually reveal.   
23 It is not possible here to give a comprehensive overview, but representative texts include Bell David 
and Kennedy Barbara (eds) The Cybercultures Reader Routledge London 2000; Crang Mike Crang 
Phil and May Jon (eds) Virtual Geographies: Bodies, space and relations Routledge London 1999; 
Smith Marc and Kollock Peter (eds) Communities in Cyberspace Routledge London 1999; Jones 
Steven (ed) Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer Mediated Communication and Community Sage 
London 1998; Featherstone Mike and Burrows Richard (eds) Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk 
Sage London 1995. 
24 I am wary of being read as suggesting a progress narrative here, but the linear structuring of an 
article makes some sort of ordering unavoidable. I am hoping not to suggest that the initial wave of 
skeptimistic theorising was then replaced with a new and improved deconstructive turn, but rather that 
both views are present in feminist evaluations of cyberspace. 
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and resistance, and thus not totally antithetical to feminist aims, some feminist 
understandings of cyberspace clearly understand it nonetheless as an extension of 
patriarchal space and values.25 Such feminist critiques of cyberspace have focused on 
the way in which it appears to reinforce the Cartesian division between mind and 
body, the ‘disembodied’ space of cyberspace seen as symbolic of transcendental 
thinking, representative of masculine prerogatives and the superiority of the intellect 
over the body, somewhat dismissively referred to as ‘meat’ in the discourse of 
cyberculture. The apparent devaluation and/or disappearance of the corporeal body in 
cyberspace is thus problematic for some feminist commentators, seen as (yet another) 
instance of the marginalisation and exclusion of women, their construction in this 
sphere as non-cerebral, unsuited to high technology, and unwelcome in this new and 
masculine space.26 Yet whereas some feminists have seen cyberspace as an inherently 
oppressive space, other feminist commentators, whilst not dismissing the issues of 
online power imbalances, have focused more on the ways in which the body appears 
in cyberspace in the sense of its textual production, cyberspace offering a new arena 
for its rearticulation. In this sphere of theorising, informed by poststructural thinking, 
gender and technology are understood to be mutually constructive, cyberspace being 
understood as a linguistic, textual space which offers the possibility to literally rewrite 
our understandings of gender. Writers in this field27 have endeavoured to show, much 
in the way that transgender holds forth the possibility to challenge the rigidity of sex 
as it is currently understood,28 how the articulation of the self in cyberspace offers a 
chance to problematise and rescript the boundaries of bodies and gender/s. Virtuality 
can be seen as a space for thinking a radical futurity, as Wacjman summarises, 'In 
looking forward to what ICTs … may make possible, such writers elaborate a new 
feminist 'imaginary' different from the 'material reality' of the existing technological 
order'.29 The main ways in which cyberspace facilitates this gender and corporeal 
plasticity is through the requirement to literally write the body in a purely textual 
space. Digital bodies explore the limits of concepts of the body, but without the 
constraints of the flesh. Indeed, it is the very lack of flesh that can be seen to give rise 
to its deconstructive potential. As visual cues can be absent in cyberspace, people can 
present themselves in alternative ways, experimenting with gender and other aspects 
                                                 
25 See further Hawthorne Susan and Klein Renate (eds) Cyberfeminism: Creativity, critique and 
connectivity Spinifex Melbourne 1999; Braidotti notes that most contemporary reconstruction of 
gender through new media culture has been focused on masculinity; Braidotti 2002 above note 10 at 
247. I am broadly in agreement, but consider that this focus should not preclude an examination of the 
more radical potentials of cyberspace regarding gender and embodiment, as I discuss below.  
26 See further Squires Judith 'Fabulous Feminist Futures and the Lure of Cyberculture' in Dovey Jon 
(ed) Fractal Dreams: New Media in Social Context Lawrence and Wishart London 1996 p 194. 
27 See e.g. Turkle Sherry Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson London 1995; Stone Rosanne Allucquere The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of 
the Mechanical Age MIT Press Cambridge and London 1995; McRae Shannon ‘Coming Apart at the 
Seams: Sex, Text and the Virtual Body’ HTML document formerly published on the web, on file with 
author. This appears to be a version of her published chapter of the same name in Cherny Lynn and 
Reba Wise Elizabeth (eds) Wired Women: Gender and New Realities in Cyberspace  Seal Press Seattle 
1996 242. 
28 As Sharpe observes, ‘[transgender] has been used increasingly to accommodate people who identify 
as both, neither, or something other than male or female … the position of the ‘third’ (fourth, fifth…)’ 
Sharpe Andrew Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law Cavendish London 2002 p 2. 
29 Wajcman Judy 'From Women and technology to Gendered Technoscience' (2007) 10 Information, 




of the self. The deconstructive potential of this fluidity is summarised by McRae, who 
explains that: 
if boys can be girls and straights can be queers and dykes can be fags and two 
lesbian lovers turn out both to be men in real life, then ‘straight,’ or ‘queer,’ 
‘male,’ or ‘female’ become problematized as markers of identity … Gender 
becomes a verb, not a noun, a position to occupy rather than a fixed role.30 
  
The virtual body is the cyborg body, challenging the concept of the body as beginning 
with or being bounded by skin and suggestive of a potentially extensive hybridity 
with digital technology.31 Theorising the body in cyberspace can on one view thus be 
seen simply as an extension of cyborg theorising, the body mediated by technology.32 
In responding to the theme of writing the body itself, and how this might be actually 
done as a concrete process, the virtual or cyber body, understood as the representation 
through text or avatar33 of the person online, is thus arguably one version of writing 
the body in a tangible sense, in that this is literally a body created through the process 
of writing it in digital media. It is an essential element of the virtual body that it is 
effectively socially communicative and legible in order for it to be able to interact 
with others, and digital bodies can be seen as experimental attempts to write the body 
in contexts where the virtual body will interact with other virtual bodies, for example, 
in online communities or mass online role playing games. In considering the validity 
of the virtual body as a ‘body’ as such, it is arguable that as a representation of the 
self that takes on the values and intentions of embodiment, the expression of feeling, 
emotion and emplacement,34 the virtual body can be seen to have corporeal qualities 
that are not present in other literally textual ‘bodies’ such as those that appear in 
works of fiction, which although fleshed out as characters, so to speak, are not 
intended to function as a representational and affective self. Whilst the virtual body 
may well possess fictional qualities, in the sense of representing the aspirational self, 
the desired, experimental self and at its extremes, even the differently embodied self, 
in its values and intentions it can be seen to have corporeal qualities. The virtual body 
is also linked to the corporeal body in that the corporeal body is required to create the 
digital one; the bones, muscles and tendons that have been identified as so definitively 
corporeal are required to be present, embodied, at the keyboard to do the actual 
writing.35 At a time when there is an intense focus on the academic, theoretical 
deconstruction of the self, cyberspace appears to be one site of this happening in 
practice, an example of where the tangible deconstruction of identity and body can be 
                                                 
30 McRae above note 27. 
31 That bodies should not necessarily begin or end with skin is a challenge initially raised by Haraway 
above note 18. 
32 Whereas in one sense, the limit of cyborg theorising would seem to suggest that some element of 
corporeality remain present, on the other, the question of whether flesh specifically is needed, and to 
what degree, remains pertinent. As I suggest below, the virtual body does retain a link to the corporeal. 
33 An avatar is a picture or three dimensional graphic model that represents the self online. More 
advanced avatars in virtual reality sites can be animated and made to interact with other avatars as part 
of the simulation of the self. Although sometimes termed as icons, I use avatar here to distinguish three 
dimensional animated models from two dimensional animated and non-animated pictures/icons.  
34 By ‘emplacement’ I am referring to the virtual body symbolising the physical presence of a body (or 
bodies) in virtuality.  
35 Braidotti writes critically of the ‘nihilistic’ tendency of cyberculture to reject/deny/transcend the 
body; ‘[a]gainst such denials, I want to re-assert my bodily brand of materialism and remain to the end 
proud to be flesh!’ (2002 above note 10 at 257). In this article I endeavour to illustrate a closer 
connection between the material and the virtual than such an assertion would appear to suggest.  
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observed. For one feminist commentator, Stone, the virtual body represents the 
direction that we are moving towards as social beings in a digital age:  
the identities that emerge from these interactions – fragmented, complex, 
diffracted through the lenses of technology, culture and new technocultural 
formations – seem to me, for better or worse, more visible as [what] we 
ourselves are in the process of becoming.36 
 
 As argued above, the virtual body certainly can be seen to have bodily 
qualities, but is it possible that the virtual body, whilst literally written, can be seen as 
a valid body in the context of writing the body as it is understood in its more specific 
senses in feminist theorising? For example, in the classic work by Elizabeth Grosz’s 
on writing the body, where she draws into focus how the body becomes socially and 
culturally wrought through the process of textualisation, the presence of a specifically 
corporeal body, as opposed to a figural or metaphorical body, seems to be key.37 For 
Grosz, it is the corporeal body that is written and the corporeal body that is given 
meaning through the incisions and inscriptions of discourse on its surfaces. Her 
understanding of body is that of the living body, made of flesh, nerves and muscles, 
which only when acted upon by processes of inscription is given meaning, resulting in 
the 'textualised' body.38 As she explains: 
The metaphorics of body writing poses the body, its epidermic surface, 
muscular-skeletal frame, ligaments, joints … as corporeal surfaces on which 
engraving inscription or ‘graffiti’ are etched. The metaphor of the textualised 
body affirms the body as a page or material surface on which messages may be 
inscribed.39 
Exploring the process of how this inscription takes place, she considers the flesh, 
bones, ligaments and blood of the body as material surfaces upon which meanings are 
inscribed or marked in various ways, incised through various discursive or concrete 
implements and/or through the ‘psychic inscriptions’40 of adornment, clothing, 
makeup and diet embossing various cultural scripts into/onto the body. Inscriptions 
may be social, discursive, gendered, and through these processes of writing the 
socially intelligible and gendered body comes into being: ‘there is nothing natural 
about these modes of corporeal inscriptions: through them, bodies are marked so as to 
make them amenable to the prevailing exigencies of power’.41 The corporeal body 
itself is thus not understood as being discursively prior in this process, not given but 
produced,42 as Ahmed observes, 'bodies are never simply and literally bodies, they are 
always inscribed within a system of value differentiation’.43 Thus the process is not 
one of straightforward and un-resisted inscription on the body’s neutral and blank 
                                                 
36 Stone 1995 above note 27 at 36. 
37 See e.g. Grosz Elizabeth Volatile Bodies 1994 Allen & Unwin Sydney; Grosz Elizabeth ‘Inscriptions 
and body-maps: representations and the corporeal’ in Threadgold Terry and Cranny-Francis Anne (eds) 
Feminine Masculine and Representation 1990 Allen & Unwin Sydney p 62; Grosz Elizabeth ‘Notes 
towards a Corporeal Feminism’ (1987) 5 Australian Feminist Studies 1; Grosz Elizabeth ‘Bodies-
Cities’ in Columina Beatriz (ed) Sexuality and Space Princeton Architectural Press New York 1992 
241. 
38 Grosz 1992 above note 37 at 243. 
39 Grosz 1990 above note 37 at 62. 
40 As above at 65. 
41 As above at 65. 
42 See Butler Judith Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ London Routledge 1993  
43 Ahmed Sara ‘Deconstruction and Law’s Other: Towards a Feminist Theory of Embodied Legal 
Rights’ (1995) 4 Social and Legal Studies 55 p 56. 
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canvass but more complex, where the body is an active and agentic surface that may 
resist the various styli of de/marcation:  
It has a texture, a tonus, a materiality that is an active ingredient in the messages 
produced. It is less like a blank, smooth, frictionless surface, a page, and more 
like a copperplate to be etched.44 
 
 In the version of writing the body that Grosz articulates, writing would appear 
to be necessarily a two-way process that needs a concrete surface, that of the body, as 
much as an apparatus of inscription to act upon it, the friction produced between them 
necessary to the production of meaning. Yet is it friction specifically or a surface that 
is needed, a surface that does not have to have a materiality in the physical sense of 
material – that of the tactile and concrete? As I have suggested above, the virtual body 
has corporeal qualities and is linked to a corporeal body, but this is not quite the same 
as writing directly upon the body that Grosz envisages, and it might appear that there 
is some slippage here, between the textually produced body described above – the 
corporeal body that becomes written, inscribed through discourse, and the more 
literally written virtual body, which has no physical surface on which to be inscribed. 
Yet 'writing the body' can be understood simultaneously in two registers here, firstly 
as the process of being written as in produced by words – the literally written body 
that is the virtual body, and secondly in the sense of being produced by the process of 
discursive inscription, the processes of discourse acting on a symbolically corporeal 
surface and not necessarily a physical one. In this latter sense, the virtual body can 
indeed be inscribed. It is arguable that in 'writing the body', the textual body, the body 
of the text and the corporeal body are not always separable, and that this process of 
writing can be both politicised and political. The cyborg body, which easily includes 
the virtual body, an illegitimate hybridity of technology and flesh, is also a textual 
body, a representative surface, as explained by Foster: 'To be a cyborg means 
accepting a postmodern condition of inhabiting a body that functions as a signifying 
surface, where the social construction of all subjectivities becomes legible.'45 
Commentators in the field of cyberspace and gender have argued that the virtual body 
also becomes intelligible through the processes of inscription and is thus textual in a 
similar sense to the corporeal body, as suggested above. Indeed, the theme of writing 
the body into intelligibility that feminist commentators have pursued have directly led 
to the analysis of the virtual body as a similarly textual production, as Stone explains: 
Judith Butler introduces the useful concept of the ‘culturally intelligible body’, 
or the criteria and the textual productions (including writing on or in the body 
itself) that each society uses to produce physical bodies that it recognizes as 
members … we can examine the production of gendered bodies in cyberspace 
also as a set of tokens that code difference within a field of ideal types.46  
                                                 
44 Grosz 1990 above note 37 at 72. In their exploration of skin as the surface of writing, Ahmed and 
Stacey suggest that the process of dermographia (writing or marking the skin) is not reductive or 
unidirectional: ‘[t]he varied contributions in this collection, which think through the skin, can be read 
as rewriting the skin, or re-skinning the writing’.  Ahmed Sara and Stacey Jackie Thinking Through the 
Skin Routledge London 2001 p 15. 
45 Foster Thomas 'Meat Puppets or Robopaths? Cyberpunk and the question of embodiment' in 
Wolmark Jenny (ed) Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and Cyberspace 
Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh 1999 208 at 212. My emphasis. 
46 Stone Alluquere Rosanne 'Will the real body please stand up? Boundary stories about virtual 
cultures' in Wolmark Jenny (ed) Cybersexualities: A Reader on Feminist Theory, Cyborgs and 
Cyberspace Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh 1999 p 93. 
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In this respect, the virtual body is textually produced in the sense of becoming 
embodied through writing, but is also textual, in that its intelligibility as a form of 
socially recognisable body is dependent on social and cultural codes of inscription. In 
one sense, the body in cyberspace is stripped away, reduced to pure text, but the 
disappearance is not complete. Particularly as bodies become understandable through 
the fact of their physical presence, for example, the importance given to describing 
the physical self in social encounters, the process of creating a virtual body forces a 
heightened focus on the qualities of embodiment that the virtual body seeks to 
emulate, due to the absence of the physical body, at times an over-compensatory 
effect. Stone notes that in embodied encounters in real space, multiple modes of 
communication are used simultaneously, ‘speech, gestures, facial expression, the 
entire gamut of semiotics’,47 whereas in other spaces of encounter, such as online, 
such modes are not available. The effects of not having these modes, Stone suggests, 
reveals a ‘deep need … to create extremely detailed images of the absent and invisible 
body, of human interaction ... ’48 The different register of virtual space means that the 
images of body need not be traditional, but can be alternative, imaginative, and 
challenging. For example Balsalmo suggests that: 
If we think of the body not as a product, but rather as a process – and 
embodiment as an effect – we can begin to ask questions about how the body is 
staged differently in different realities. Virtual environments offer a new arena 
for the staging of the body – what dramas will be played out in these virtual 
worlds?49  
 
Writing the legal body: Virtual bodies, gender and law 
 
 To this point, I have sought to argue that the virtual body can be seen as one 
version of the body as written, both in the sense of it being constructed through text, 
and becoming intelligible through discursive inscription. Pursuing the theme of bodies 
being theorised at the margins, the virtual body can be seen as a paradox, an example 
of the disappearance of the body which in turn necessitates is reappearance, its 
rescripting through text in order to appear in virtuality. The virtual body can also be 
seen as a deconstructive tool, which can illustrate ways of rethinking sex and gender 
beyond their currently embodied forms. Yet in considering the theme of writing the 
legal body specifically, how might the virtual body have relevance in addressing the 
law-body nexus, particularly from feminist perspectives? Given that the history of 
women’s struggle for legal recognition has largely been a struggle for visibility,50 
against erasure, what can be gained from interrogating an instance where the lady 
vanishes, so to speak; becomes disembodied, textual, abstract? How might writing the 
body be important for legal feminists, and does the disembodied nature of the virtual 
body undermine its usefulness in this sphere? For the virtual body to have (as I have 
                                                 
47 Stone 1995 above note 27 at 93. 
48 As above at 93.  
49 Balsalmo Anne ‘The Virtual Body in Cyberspace’ in Bell David and Kennedy Barbara (eds) The 
Cybercultures Reader Routledge London 2000 p 488 at 497-8. 
50 Even in this context, visibility is paradoxical. As noted by Phillips, even within feminism itself, after 
fighting for visibility, women may disappear from the purview of feminist critiques as they explore 
broader implications and become more generalised. See Phillips Anne ‘Feminism and the Politics of 
Difference. Or, Where Have All the Women Gone?’ in James Susan and Palmer Stephanie (eds) 
Visible Women: Essays on Feminist Legal Theory and Political Philosophy Hart Publishing Oxford 
2002 p 11 at 12. See also Grbich Judith E ‘The Body in Legal Theory’ (1992) 11 University of 
Tasmania Law Review 26  
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endeavoured to argue above) potentially useful feminist qualities is one thing, but to 
argue that it can be usefully mobilised in a feminist legal context is quite another, as 
whilst the deconstruction and rearticulating of gender and the body is a feasible item 
to follow on the feminist agenda, whether this can be useful in law, seemingly 
grounded in the corporeal, is quite another. The disappearance of the body – its 
vanishing – might at first glance to seem antithetical to feminist aims, particularly in 
the context of the law, which have long focused on embodiment. In order to address 
these questions, in this final section of the article, I consider why writing the body is 
significant for feminist legal theorists, and what the virtual body, as one such written 
body, might be able to offer feminist legal thinking in addressing the law-body 
connection. 
 
 Whilst it has been noted that feminism in general has been on some levels 
wary of ‘concepts the body’, in that the essentialised, naturalised, and biologised body 
has long been the site of oppression for women,51 in the context of feminist legal 
theory, it is precisely because of this fact that a critique of the body and concepts of 
the body have been necessary.52 It is because of the fact that the corporeal body is a 
specific site of suffering for women53 that a focus on it is required for feminist legal 
theorists, as identified in the legal constructions of the female body and responses to it 
in the context of issues such as abortion, pregnancy, rape, sexual harassment, violence 
– whether in the public or private sphere, infertility, reproduction.54 Far from being a 
neutral and universal relationship, the law-body nexus for legal feminists has 
traditionally gendered, politicised and specifically embodied, the corporeal body 
itself, as distinct from the figural or conceptual body, central to feminist legal 
thinking. Whilst we note its disappearance, through acts of legal erasure and 
foreclosure, we also note its appearance before the law, its construction through the 
law and its centrality to our specifically gendered experiences. For feminist legal 
theorists, the law-body nexus is markedly characterised by gendered and embodied 
encounters which are frequently violent or oppressive. In that the body is the site 
where we feel the effects of violence in its many forms, whether legal, physical, 
emotional, the task of writing the body, articulating its pleasures, injuries and 
possibilities, becomes critical in bringing our experiences into intelligibility, a 
politicised process of bearing witness and defying our disappearance through the 
endurance of text. Writing the body has a particular significance for feminist legal 
theorists precisely because the law is so heavily textual55 – metaphorically as well as 
                                                 
51 Grosz 1987 above note 37 at 4. 
52 Therese Murphy notes in ‘Feminism on Flesh’ (1997) VIII Law and Critique 37 that feminist legal 
attitudes towards the (corporeal) body are ambivalent on many levels. Whilst I suggest here that 
corporeality is central for feminist legal theorists, I am not suggesting that this focus should be at the 
expense of concepts of the body. Arguably, both are needed. See also Grbich above note 50. 
53 In ‘Gut Feminism’, Elizabeth Wilson questions theories of embodiment based on Freudian theories 
that see the corporeal – in the sense of biological – body as a passive surface acted upon by the 
psychological forces of the mind. Exploring the anorexic/bulimic body, Wilson suggests a focus on the 
biological body that understands its ‘symptoms’ not as animated by the mind, but as materialisations 
which the biological body naturally intends: ‘mood is not added onto the gut, secondarily … rather, 
temper, like digestion, is one of the events to which enteric substrata are naturally (originally) 
inclined.’ Wilson above note 13 at 85. 
54 For an exploration of female embodiment, injury and law see West Robin 'The Difference in 
Women’s Hedonic Lives' in Fineman Martha and Thomadsen Nancy (eds) At the Boundaries of Law: 
Feminism and Legal Theory Routledge New York 1991 p 115. 
55 The idea of the body being constructed through the texts of law is well established. For a 
comprehensive overview see Hyde Alan Bodies of Law Princeton University Press Princeton 1997. 
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literally, hence the letter of the law signifying its strict interpretation, following which 
one is brought to book.56 Although in one respect the law is organised around 
corporeal bodies (the architecture of the courtroom a theatre for the spectacle of the 
body on trial, the concrete construction of the jail cell a physical cage to prevent the 
escape and liberty of the criminal body, the ceremonial robes, wigs and uniforms by 
which we identify the agents of the law authored by their bodies57 and the concept of 
justice represented, in the Western tradition, at least, in the figure of Themis or 
Justicia holding balanced scales and sword58), the actual woman before the law, in the 
sense of being present in the courtroom, finds herself object, often abject, but less 
than subject, her embodied self and her articulation of its experiences coming a distant 
second to the weight and authority of masculine legal discourse, the arguments of 
counsel and the physical text of the statute or case law. Whereas the effect of legal 
text applies to all law’s bodies, legal feminists have long argued that there are 
gendered differences in the way that these texts are applied and the effects that they 
have. Writing the legal body, particularly the female body before the law, thus 
becomes a point of critical engagement,59 and understanding this textual body is key, 
as Robson suggests: 
[W]e are at a stage where we learn to describe our physical selves ‘as 
“inscribed” … We describe our inscriptions: we are gendered as female. We are 
politicised as feminist, arguing about whether politics is a ‘real’ inscription … 
Despite our attentions to our bodies, what we privilege is our texts.60  
Writing the body to reveal it as well as re-writing it is also vital for feminist legal 
theorists as a political strategy of highlighting the editorial nature of the law as much 
as its authorial role, its role in writing the body as opposed to its acting on a pre-given 
entity, and what’s left out in that editorial process. To heed the warning of Nicole 
Brossard, who argues that those who do not reinvent the wor(l)d are in the process of 
disappearing, 61 writing our bodies against their erasure is a method of making us 
                                                 
56 That is, before having it thrown at you. 
57 Usually male bodies, although when female bodies are agents of the law, it is notable how their 
sexed difference has to be managed, for example as seen in the debates how they might be ad/dressed. 
British Barrister Clarissa Dickson-Wright notes in her autobiography (Spilling the Beans Hodder and 
Staughton London 2007) that the lack of female lavatories was a reason traditionally mobilised to 
exclude women from Chambers – a prime example of the ‘leaky’ nature of the female body being a 
threat to the male order and space of law. On court architecture and power, although not a feminist 
analysis, Sugarman’s analysis is instructive. See Sugarman David 'Images of Law: Legal Buildings, 
Englishness and the Reproduction of Power' in Schulze Reiner (ed) Rechtssymbolik und 
Wertevermittlung Duncker and Humblot Berlin 2004 p 167. 
58 A blindfold is also typical, but not essential, as seen, for example, on the statue adorning London’s 
Central Criminal Court, the Old Bailey. See further Burnett Cathleen ‘Justice: Myth and Symbol’ 
(1987) XI Legal Studies Forum 79; Curtis Dennis E and Resnik Judith 'Images of Justice' (1987) 96 
Yale Law Journal 1727. Why justice should be specifically sexed is a question beyond the scope of this 
article, although it is worth considering why it is justice as opposed to law itself that is so embodied. 
59 Even this process is fraught with difficulty, in that the task becomes one of authoring/scripting 
women’s experiences to the law without reproducing the conditions of its power. Compare Grbich 
above note 50 at 28-9.  
60 Robson Ruthann Sappho Goes to Law School Columbia University Press New York 1995 p 45. 
61 I paraphrase Nicole Brossard from Robson Ruthann 'Embodiments: The Possibilities of Lesbian 
Legal Theory in Bodies Problematized by Postmodernisms and Feminisms' (1992) 2 Law and Sexuality 
37 at 40. Both Robson and Brossard are writing in the context of textuality and lesbian bodies, which 
are even more prone to legal erasure than the heterosexual woman (on this point see further Zetlein 
Sarah 'Lesbian Bodies Before the Law: Chicks in White Satin' (1995) 5 The Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 49). Whilst I am in full agreement with all three authors, I believe that in this context the 
metaphor can be brought to serve for women’s bodies generally. 
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legible, a mode of visibility, and visibility is a form of survival. Of course, reading 
and writing are relational, and where we can, we read ourselves between the lines of 
the law, but writing the body becomes necessary as a strategy of resistance, to write 
into being bodies otherwise obscured by the current legal canon (and canon, pursuing 
the literary theme of writing the body, seems the most appropriate word to use in this 
context, describing as it does the list of authoritative texts accepted as Scripture), 
and/or in opposition to them, and as a strategy of discovery and imagination, in that 
the process of writing brings different futures and possibilities into intelligibility. We 
must therefore write ourselves into the legal codex to counter what is lost in 
translation, our erasure both bodily and textual, our relegation to marginalia, our 
indexical ellipsis.62 In this context, writing the female body becomes a practice and 
process of cryptography, cryptography being the science and art of hiding and 
revealing information.63 Cryptography, from the Greek roots of writing (graphein) 
and hidden/secret (kryptos), considers how messages may be rendered intelligible and 
unintelligible, plaintext being the cryptological64 word describing the information to 
be hidden, and cryptanalyzing the unauthorised breaking of that information. The 
description of the feminist legal project of writing the female body as cryptographical 
is really more than just metaphorical. As seen above, the language of law renders 
women unintelligible, obscured, hidden, an unrepresentative translation of their 
embodied selves which is foreign to their understanding and does violence to their 
experiences. Explaining the use of law’s arcane terminology to describe the female 
body, – a process which I identify here as cryptographic – Grbich has written: 
A woman’s embodied imaginings are silenced by the available discourse, in the 
sense that any departure from the script already written robs the practice of their 
rationale … A woman is silenced because the text only has a rationale when she 
follows the script, her presence in the court is given the meaning which the 
representational practices of the text provide.65  
With reference to the law’s enciphering of the female body in particular, then, the 
ways in which it is rendered obscure or hidden by the law, the feminist legal project 
of writing the legal body is a project of making it visible where it is obscured, and 
where it emerges enciphered by the language of the law terms, to rearticulate it in 
terms which more closely reflect women’s lived experiences66 – in short, a project of  
                                                 
62 In the process of bookbinding, the metaphor of the textual body is reversed, in that text of the book 
becomes embodied, spines encased by hide, enjoined by glues from bone and skin. Editing becomes 
injurious to the body of the text, the cropping of the pages into the print described as bleeding. See 
Zaehnsdorf Joseph The Art of Bookbinding 2nd Ed Gregg International Farnborough 1969; United 
States Government Printing Office Bookbinding Theory and Practice Washington US Government 
Printing Office 1962. I thank Brady Bookbinders, Lancaster University for bringing these printing 
terminologies to my attention. For an interrogation of the indexical, see Doane Mary Ann (special 
edition on) ‘Indexicality: Trace and Sign' (2007) 18 differences. On another occasion, the issues of 
connectivity, indication, trace and sign that the index connotes (and trace itself) could be worked out 
more fully and profitably in relation to writing the legal body. 
63 The question of whether cryptography can be considered scientific or artistic is considered in Mollin 
Richard A An Introduction to Cryptography Chapman and Hall/CRC Press Boca Raton 2002 p 1 
footnote 1.1; See further D’Agapeyeff Alexander Codes and Ciphers Oxford University Press London 
1960; Khan David The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing Weidenfeld and Nicolson London 
1966; Pratt Fletcher Secret and Urgent Blue Ribbon Books Garden City 1942. 
64 As explained by Mollin above note 63 at 1, ‘The term cryptology is used to embody the study of both 
cryptography and cryptanalysis’. 
65 Grbich above note 50 at 50. 
66 As noted above, the original message is known as the plaintext, yet, if it is acknowledged that the 
body is enciphered/inscripted more than once (as I will go on to discus below), law being but one 
discourse acting upon it, then even when all these processes are deciphered – if this is even possible – 
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cryptanalysis. It is noteworthy that in purely cryptographic contexts, it has been 
observed that: 
Some people (if not entire cultures) find the terms encrypt and decrypt to be 
repugnant since the terms may be interpreted as referring to dead bodies. Thus 
encipher and decipher are becoming standard in usage.67 
Yet in the context of usage outlined here, the language and methods of cryptology are 
singularly appropriate, in that returning to the etymology of its terms, the root of crypt 
becomes more than metaphorical but a literal reference to the location of the hidden 
(female) body, decrypting its related exhumation, the task of uncovering the female 
body in law. Enigmatic to the law, we must thus become cryptanalysts, writing our 
bodies to unravel their legal encryption. On a strict cryptographical interpretation, law 
enciphers as opposed to encoding, in that cipher and code differ in cryptography, as 
explained by Pratt:  
every letter of the original … is represented by a letter, figure or symbol of the 
enciphered message. In a code, a code-word … stands for a phrase, a sentence, 
or even the whole message … ciphers are thus systematic … codes are wholly 
arbitrary. 68  
Whereas anyone with the key (the arranged pattern, settings or order of the 
information) can translate a cipher, without the code-book or code-dictionary the 
same cannot be said of code.69 In the true cryptographic sense, the discourse of law is 
really more properly in the nature of cipher, in that it can be deciphered with specific 
legal knowledge, but is not wholly arbitrary. Yet whereas deciphering is the 
authorised act of revealing enciphered information, I say that feminist legal 
endeavours in writing the female body are in the nature of cryptanalyzing because 
their efforts run counter to the intention of law, an illegitimate interpretation of a 
discourse never meant for them. The process of cryptography, is, after all, designed to 
hide and obscure messages from those not authorised to receive them, thus the efforts 
of those who seek to reveal and interpret are a challenge, the acts of an opponent. As 
Mollin explains,  
Anyone who engages in cryptography is called a cryptographer. On the other 
hand, the study of … techniques for attempting to defeat cryptographic methods 
is called cryptanalysis. Those practicing cryptanalysis (usually termed the 
“enemy”) are called cryptanalysts.70 
 
 I have argued above that the body – the corporeal body as opposed to the 
conceptual body – has been central for both feminist legal thinkers and the law itself, 
but that the textualised body has also been increasingly significant in theorising how 
the body comes to be gendered, bounded and otherwise culturally intelligible. I have 
also endeavoured to show how and why writing the legal body has been a specifically 
feminist legal project. It is at this point, in interrogating the law-body nexus, that the 
virtual body can become useful to feminist legal theorists. As I have suggested above, 
it provides a useful challenge to the traditional legal concept of the body as discretely 
                                                                                                                                            
there is no ‘plaintext’ or pure message underneath. In this respect, cryptanalysis in its pure sense 
maintains no deconstruction (indeed, arguably such indeterminacy would be fatal to the project) as 
there must be an unadulterated message underneath, yet in my reading of feminist legal cryptanalysis, 
as in legal cryptanalysis, there can never be such an original – I am not suggesting that feminist legal 
endeavours reveal a singular or straightforward ‘truth’.   
67 Mollin above note 63 at 1 footnote 1.2. 
68 Pratt above note 63 at 13.   
69 As above at 13.  
70 Mollin above note 50 at 1-2 [emphasis in the original]. 
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bounded and specifically engendered. Although there is a rightly-held feminist 
anxiety that the interpretation of the body as textual renders it disembodied, and as 
such a loss of the political, it is arguable that seeing the virtual body as losing the 
political in its disjuncture from the body is arguably to misunderstand its nature, 
mistaking deconstruction for destruction, as it is arguably the very quality of 
disjuncture – rendering transparent the literal writing of the body – that forces a 
highlight on the ways in which the body is and can be scripted. Rather than seeing 
virtual disembodiment as symptomatic of the further erasure of women’s (embodied) 
reality and political status, feminists can take the approach of calling into question the 
very terms under which embodiment is constructed. Considering the virtual, textual 
body can also help us consider how the nature of the connection between the textual, 
virtual and embodied might be expressed in law, for example, it is the consideration 
of the body as textual/virtual with a strong link to the corporeal body that can allow 
feminists to theorise recent legal developments relating to the virtual depiction of the 
body in child and adult pornography. A feminist legal theory which does not 
resolutely cast the law-body nexus as exclusively corporeal would find it easier to 
accommodate the harms suggested by the criminalisation of such images, even those 
which are purely imaginary. A more elastic conception of the law/body nexus, 
facilitated by a consideration of the virtual and textual body can thus be usefully 
brought to bear on contemporary debates, and brings into consideration those limit 
conceptions of the body articulated in the introduction to this article. The 
deconstruction of the body does not have to entail its political (or material) erasure. 
Feminists can still use the concept of the body, whilst at the same time questioning 
and exploring the political significance of the formation of its contours, a process 
which the virtual body can bring into sharp relief.71 Given that law is one of the 
discourses that constructs the body as specifically bounded and gendered, the 
challenge to the nature and contours of the body that the virtual body brings is worth 
considering.  In this respect it is not so much the virtual body itself that is useful but 
the process of writing it, its ability to render more transparent some of processes of 
scripting that make bodies intelligible, much like the wider work on writing the body 
in feminist scholarship endeavours to reveal the ways in which discursive inscriptions 
mark the body of flesh as corporeal, human and gendered. This is not to say that the 
virtual body necessitates an instant political transformation, but rather that it is a 
vehicle that draws to our attention the processes of writing as creating the body. In 
endeavouring to script the body, it is arguable that feminist theorists are not lacking in 
epistemology, but the virtual body suggests at least one methodology as to how this 
scripting might be achieved. Endeavouring to write fluidic virtual bodies into the law 
may help to challenge and broaden law's current understanding of the limits and 
possibilities of gender, and of how concepts of gender might be differently related to 
the body. In a sense, there is no point in feminist theorising reconceptualising the 
nature and limits of gender if such articulations always remain at the level of the 
theoretical – writing, or rather, re-writing the legal body in alternative bodily and 
gender configurations is a move that brings futurity closer to reality. In that a valid 
feminist aim is thinking and doing gender in alternative ways, as I have argued above, 
the virtual body also provides a forum for doing this, an arena for experimentation 
where alternative futures and embodiments can be considered and played out.  
 
                                                 
71 This line of argument is grounded in and developed from the work of Carl Stychin, who explores the 
dissolution of the subject and body in postmodern thinking in Stychin Carl Law’s Desire Routledge 
London 1995 p 21.  
15 
 
 In returning to the centrality of the body, and writing the legal body in 
particular, it is no coincidence that body and law are thought of in terms of nexus: in 
terms of close connection, relationship and integration. In outlining what I see as the 
feminist legal project in writing the body above, I have argued that one of the tasks is 
to include women's experiences in the legal lexicon that have otherwise been 
obscured, erased or unwritten. Whilst in some respects the virtual body has been 
understood as symptomatic of bodily erasure, the very thing that some feminist 
theorists have sought to resist in law, thought of from a different perspective, the 
virtual body can be written into the law to include those instances in virtual space 
where the representational body experiences oppression or abuse. As commentators 
on gender and virtuality acknowledge, although there exists great potential to explore 
gender and bodies in new forms, cyberspace has not been a level field of power, and 
the transference of gender oppression online remains a problem. As I have argued, the 
law seeks and maintains the boundaries of the body, but as also shown, this body is 
dissolving, its dissolution in cyberspace being but one facet of disintegration. In her 
article on the criminology of hybrids, Sheila Brown questions whether 'control, 
punishment, compliance, legislature, constitutions, [can] rest on such an unclear and 
fragile proposition as the 'human being'''.72 As Brown argues, whereas traditional 
feminist paradigms of harm presume embodiment as the basis of victimhood, this 
connection – which is also articulated as the law-body connection – is problematised 
in cyberspace, where it is the avatar or image that is immediately concerned: 
In cyber rape it is the virtual self that is being violated; the 'real' self of which it 
is an extension … [i]n cyberhate, textual violence and role-playing stand proxy 
for embodied race-hate … the degree to which we traditionally depend on a 
stable and attributable locus of identity for the purposes of moral and legal 
attribution is brought sharply into focus when practical harms arising from the 
disruption of these definitions is considered.73 
While Brown explores actor-network theory as a possible means of theorising how 
law might encounter the virtual actant, I would suggest that the strategies of writing 
the body might also be pursued. An acknowledgement of virtual bodies as connected 
to corporeal bodies might be one way for the law to treat more seriously those 
instances where the virtual self is oppressed, as this has consequences for its 
embodied creator. This is not an argument that the virtual body should be given the 
equivalence of the corporeal body in law, and 'virtual' harms given the same legal 
status, as it is difficult to equate the two, yet even this distinction is beginning to falter 
in some legal contexts, for example, as seen in the aforementioned legal treatment of 
virtual, purely imaginary images of children in the context of child pornography, and 
the strong emotional reactions to 'virtual' violations of online adult selves that have 
been noted by feminist writers on gender and cyberspace suggest that these 
experiences, whilst clearly not being of the same magnitude as their embodied 
counterparts, are more than mere abstractions.74 Considering the law/body nexus in 
more expansive ways through a consideration of the virtual, textual body in this way 
enables feminist legal theory to broaden its conceptualisations of harm and bring such 
experiences into visibility. In writing the legal body, the inclusion of virtual bodies as 
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legal bodies to bring them into some sort of accountability would help to counter the 
low level of importance and/or dismissal currently accorded by the law to instances of 
online harassment, racism and other virtual harms. In this respect, to write the 
accountability and affectivity of virtual bodies into the law would be one way of 
acknowledging the instances of abuses of power that can happen in online forums, 
and a way for both law and feminist legal theorists to acknowledge that whilst the 
body is still central, challenging the limits of the corporeal is also essential, and that 
writing the legal body should acknowledge that the effects of the corporeal extend 
beyond the surface of the skin.  
